In this paper we present an algebra of actors extended with mechanisms to model crash failures and their detection. We show how this extended algebra of actors can be successfully used to specify distributed software architectures. The main components of a software architecture can be specified following an object-oriented style and then they can be composed using asynchronous message passing or more complex interaction patterns. We illustrate this process by means of a case study: the specification of a software architecture for intelligent agents which supports a fault tolerant anonymous interaction protocol.
Introduction
The object oriented paradigm has been successfully used in many fields of computer science influencing methodologies, techniques, programming languages and tools. Among them objectoriented design can be considered a standard approach for the design phase in the development of software systems. Object oriented design provides a methodology to organize the main building blocks of a software system exploiting objects, classes and inheritance. This also holds for the first phase of the design process which concerns the specification of a software architecture. A software architecture is an abstract view of a software system distinct from the details of implementation, algorithms, and data representation. The object-oriented approach allows a software designer to efficiently characterize and organize the main components of a software architecture providing a clean and reusable formalization. However, in the design phase another dimension of complexity arises which concern the interaction among the components of a software architecture. In fact formalisms for object oriented design have often components to model the dynamics of a system, for example the UML activity diagrams [12] . The object-oriented paradigm recommends object identity, methods and message-passing to govern object interaction, but it is not trivial to extend all these concepts to a distributed scenario [14] and to encapsulate them in an abstract and compositional specification language. On the other hand, due to their compositional and abstract nature, process algebras have been widely adopted for the specification of software systems, especially those with communicating, concurrently executing components. However, most of the efforts are oriented to study process algebras such as CCS [15] or the -calculus [16] which do not provide a direct representation of objects as first class entities. In these formalisms processes are stateless entities which communicate exploiting synchronous message passing and the representation of an object involves a large number of processes. As a consequence of this situation it is difficult to import the compositional properties of standard process algebras to an object oriented specification, because most of the laws concern stateless processes and not objects. In order to address this issue, Gaspari and Zavattaro [8] have proposed a process algebra based on a distributed object-oriented model (the Actor model [1] ). The main result of this effort is the development of a formalism (the Algebra of Actors) which represents a compromise between the standard process algebras and the Actor model. Therefore, this formalism allow us to reuse standard results of the theory of concurrency in a context where object-based features (such as object identity, asynchronous message passing, implicit message acceptance and dynamic object creation) are provided.
An additional problem arises when software architectures deal with distributed systems which are often subject to failures of some of their components. A reasonable property which could be expressed at the architectural level for these systems is to guarantee some degree of fault tolerance. To achieve this goal the formal framework used for specifying a software architecture should provide abstract mechanisms for modelling failures and for reasoning about them.
In this paper we provide an extension of the actor algebra to model crash failures of actors and their detection. Then we show how this extended algebra of actors can be successfully used to specify distributed software architectures. The main components of a software architecture can be specified following an object-oriented style and then they can be composed using asynchronous message passing or more complex interaction patterns. The result of a formal specification is a set of actor terms which represent the main building blocks of a software architecture. These terms can be managed with the standard tools provided by process algebra such as bisimulation or equality laws. We illustrate this process by means of a case study: the specification of a software architecture for intelligent agents which supports a fault tolerant anonymous interaction protocol.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall the algebra of actors. In Section 3 we provide a classification of failures in distributed systems and we introduce the concept of unreliable failure detector. In Section 4 we present an extension of the actor algebra to formalize crash failures of actors and failure detectors. In Section 5 we present the specification of an agent architecture which supports an anonymous interaction protocol outlining the main design requirements, and subsequently, in Section 6, we show that the specification satisfies these re- UBLCS-2003-9 ; e.g. h . An actor term is well formed if and only if it does not contain two distinct actors with the same name. In the following we will consider only well formed terms, and we will use to denote the set of well formed terms (
will range only over ). Note that actors don't have an explicit receive primitive, which is instead implicit. Therefore, the receive operation does not correspond to an operation in the programming language and it is performed implicitly at certain points of the computation: only idle actors receive messages, and so become activated. ). The other rules are simply adaptation to our calculus of the standard laws for the -calculus. The restriction operator allows to define local names, hence only actions which does not include restricted actor names can be executed by the agent h m ¡ (rule
$ 4 3 @
). The only way to pass throw a restriction is defined by the rule X h 4 U
: an actor can send restricted actor names in order to make them know to actors external to the restriction. In this case the names sent to the outside are no more restricted and they are stored in the set The full algebra of actors, including a discussion about the main differences with respect to the formal semantics of actors and about different notions of equivalence of actor terms, can be found in [8, 9, 10] .
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Failures and Failure Detectors
Classifying failures and understanding their nature is fundamental if one wants to design an architecture of a distributed system which is able to tolerate and/or continue service despite malfunctions. Hence failures must be considered essential aspects of distributed systems. Problems in fault-tolerant distributed computing have been studied in a variety of computational models [17] . Such models fall into two broad categories, message-passing and shared-memory. In the former, processes communicate by sending and receiving messages over the links of a network; in the latter, they communicate by accessing shared objects, such as registers, queues, etc. Since actors communicate by means of an asynchronous message passing mechanism, in this paper we focus only on message-passing models. The parameters which characterise a particular messagepassing model may be the following: synchrony of processes and communication, types of actor failures, types of communication failures, network topology, and deterministic versus randomized processes.
In this section we present the failure model that we consider for actors based on a well known classification of process failures in distributed systems [17] . Then we recall the notion of unreliable failure detector for asynchronous distributed systems [2] which will be used as a starting point to model a failure detector primitive in the actor algebra.
Actor Failures
An actor is faulty in an execution if its behaviour deviates from that prescribed by the algorithm it is running; otherwise, it is correct. A model of failure specifies in what way a faulty actor can deviate from its algorithm. The following is a list of models of failures that have been studied in the literature: Arbitrary with message authentication: faulty actors can exhibit arbitrary behaviour but a mechanism for authenticating messages using unforgeable signature is available. With arbitrary failures, a faulty actor may claim to have received a particular message from a correct actor, even though it never did. A message authentication mechanism allows the other correct processes to validate this claim. Figure 1 .
PSfrag replacements
The failure model we consider in this proposal is characterised by crash failures of actors in a fully asynchronous system. Actors communicate by asynchronous and reliable message passing, i.e. whenever a message is sent it must be eventually received by the target actor (thus we don't handle communication failures, such as send or receive omission). The asynchrony of the system implies that there is no bound on message delay, clock drift or the time necessary to execute a step (so we omit all timing-based failures).
Failure Detectors
Since impossibility results for asynchronous systems stem from the inherent difficulty of determining whether a process has actually crashed or is only "very slow", Chandra and Toueg [2] propose to augment the asynchronous model of computation with a model of an external failure detection mechanism that can make mistakes. In particular, they model the concept of unreliable failure detector for systems with crash failures. Failure detectors are distributed: each process has access to a local failure detector module. Each local module monitors a subset of the processes in the system, and maintains a list of those that it currently suspects to have crashed. Each failure detector module can make mistakes by erroneously adding processes to its list of suspects: i.e., it can suspect that a process X has crashed even though X is still running. If this module later believes that suspecting X was a mistake, it can remove X from its list. Thus, each module may repeatedly add and remove processes from its list of suspects. Furthermore, at any given time the failure detector modules at two different processes may have different lists of suspects. It is important to note that the mistakes made by an unreliable failure detector should not prevent any correct process from behaving according to specification even if that process is (erroneously) suspected to have crashed by all the other processes.
Modelling Crash Failures and Failure Detectors
In this section we present an extension of the actor algebra to formalize crash failures of actors and failure detectors. Our aim is to extend the computational model of the algebra with rules for modelling possible crashes of actors. We assume that any given actor can crash at any time and we introduce specific (crash) transitions to model these events. Crash transitions will be always enabled in the transition system and they will fire for both idle and active actors. However, despite the transition system has been extended modelling crashes, actors will not be able to detect them using their standard primitives. In fact the behaviour of an actors only depends on its local state and on the incoming messages. An actor (and in general a process) is not aware of the state and properties of other actors, unless they will be explicitly notified by appropriate messages. For this reason we extend the algebra with a specific ping primitive which will be the basis to realize an unreliable failure detector.
Crash Failures in the Actor Algebra
In order to model a crash failure in the algebra, we need to extend the standard behaviours of actors. As we have seen in Section 2, an actor can be idle (when is ready to receive a message) or active (when it receives a message). To model a crash, we provide a syntactic symbol
, which indicates that actor ¡ has crashed. Consequently the set of actor terms of the algebra is updated with this new term:
In the following we denote a correct actor by
, which means that the actor
), but not faulty. Any correct actor in the system can crash and consequently become a faulty actor, as described in the following transition rules:
The first rule deals with a crash of an idle actor ¢ r f
. We model this failure by means of a transition from the idle actor to the respective faulty actor. The second rule is analogous to the first one and deals with a crash of an active actor ¢ by cf . When one of the previous transitions fires, then an actor becomes faulty and therefore will not be able to do nothing from that point on. Note that, consistent with the rules Send and Receive (Table 1) , only correct actors are able to send and receive messages.
Detecting Failures in the Actor Algebra
To detect crashes of actors we need to extend the algebra with an appropriate primitive that is usually called X % x U 5 R in distributed systems. The task of this primitive is inherently difficult in asynchronous distributed systems, because in general it is not possible to detect if a certain site has crashed or is only very slow. Our aim is to model this uncertainty in the actor algebra. We introduce a primitive having the form: 
This is the property of uncertainty: if an actor ¢ is correct, then it can be erroneously suspected by any correct actors.
To formalize these features we add three transition rules: ). Observe that the transition doesn't change the behaviour of the faulty actor, which remains crashed. The second and the third rules implement the unreliable behaviour of the primitive X %U 7 R
: if rule (9) fires the actor is considered too slow, otherwise if rule (8) fire the behaviour is correct.
It's important to observe that such unreliability is the same we can find, for instance, in some implementation of failure detectors based on a "time-out" mechanism (an example of a time-out based implementation is shown in Figure 2 In Table 2 the new set of transition rules which define the labelled transition system of the algebra is summarized.
Modelling an unreliable Failure Detector
An unreliable failure detector can be modelled in the actor algebra using the X % x U 7 R primitive. Typically a failure detector is a distributed program: each site in a distributed system has its own failure detector module.
In the algebra of actors if we consider a system composed of a fixed set of actors In order to provide a more compact notation we use the following functions which operate on the state of the detector:
): updates the field 
.
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A Case Study: An Agent Architecture for Anonymous Interaction
The algebra of actors we have presented above is a powerful tool for specifying software architectures. A software architecture is described specifying its main components as actors and connecting them. We illustrate this process by means of a case study: the design of an agent architecture for supporting anonymous interaction. Agents provide services to the outside world and request services to other agents. The requests of knowledge are anonymous and independent from low level issues, such as management of agent names, routing and agent reachability.
Following the style of [6] an agent in the system has a symbolic (logical) name and a virtual knowledge base (VKB), which is a set of first order formulas. Let
be a countable set of agent names ranged over by¨¡ ,¢ ,¨£ , §
F § §
. Let
© d
be the virtual knowledge base of agent¡ .
The anonymous interaction protocol which we study is realized by means of the following two agent primitives:
asks all agents interested in p for an instantiation of p which is true in their VKB . These primitives should satisfy the following specification requirements.
1 Knowledge-level programming requirement. The notion of knowledge-level in the context of multi-agent systems has been discussed in detail by Gaspari in [6] . Following that approach, we require a knowledge-level model for agents: that is, they should provide communication primitives which support the use, request and supply of knowledge independently from implementationrelated aspects. Syntactically both ask-everybody and all-answers can be considered at the knowledgelevel, since they both have propositional contents. However, this is not enough to guarantee a correct knowledge-level behaviour. In [6] additional conditions are postulated which require an accurate specification of the underlying agent architecture in order to ensure knowledge-level behaviour. We recall these conditions below. . Note that the ask-everybody primitive includes the name of the sender agent. This is necessary because the recipient agents needs to know the name of the sender to send it the replay. As discussed in [6] agents modelling real world situations in many cases need to know the name and the beliefs of a partner agent in order to perform an agent-to-agent interaction. This name is usually included in the primitives of Agent Communication Languages [4, 5] .
v The programmer should not have to handle starvation issues explicitly. A situation of starvation arises when an agent's primitive never gets executed despite being enabled.
v
The programmer should not have to handle communication deadlocks explicitly. A communication deadlock situation occurs when two agents try to communicate, but they do not succeed; for instance because they mutually wait for each other to answer a query [19] .
The informal definition of ask-everybody and all-answers we have given above, it is not sufficient to show that these requirements hold. To achieve this goal we have to specify the details of the concurrent behaviour of these primitives and of the underlying agent architecture.
2 Open multi-agent system requirement. In the research on multi-agent systems there is an increasing emphasis on the open-ended nature of agent systems, which refers to the feature of supporting the dynamic integration of new agents into an existing agent system. In such systems, which are referred as open multi-agent systems, it is usually impossible that agents possess complete built-in information about the other agents in the system, simply because such information will initially be unavailable. As was already pointed out by Hewitt and de Jong ( [13] ) the only thing that holds the components of an open system in common, is their ability to communicate. This means that an important ingredient of an open multi-agent system will be the agents' ability to communicate about each other, especially about features like their capabilities and their expertise. Our requirement is that the anonymous interaction protocol should function in open multi-agent systems. Thus both ask-everybody and all-answers should be designed to deal with a dynamic system of agents where new agents are added dynamically to cooperate with the existing ones, and agents can leave the community when their tasks terminate.
An Agent Architecture for Anonymous Interaction
Each agent has a knowledge-level (KL) component which implements the VKB of the agent and its reactive behaviour (see Figure 4) ). This component only deals with knowledge-level operations and it is able to answer requests from other agents. To realize the anonymous interaction protocol we exploit a distributed facilitator service which is hidden at the knowledge-level and provides mechanisms for registering capabilities of agents and delivering messages to the recipient actors.
Facilitators are distributed and encapsulated in the architecture of agents (Figure 4) . Each agent has its own local facilitator component which executes a distributed algorithm: it forwards control information to all the other local facilitators, and delivers messages to their destinations. Since the facilitators are encapsulated in the agent architecture, they are not visible at the knowledge-level. Therefore, although facilitators deal with some low-level issues, we do not violate our knowledge-level requirement.
An additional difficulty which the specification of the anonymous interaction protocol should take into account is that multi-agent systems are prone to the same failures that can occur in any distributed software system. An agent may become unavailable suddenly due to various reasons. The agent may die due to unexpected conditions, improper handling of exceptions and other bugs in the agent program or in the supporting environment. The machine on which the agent process is running may crash due to hardware and software faults.
Since we have postulated that to ensure knowledge-level programming the programmer should not have to handle agent crashes and communication faults explicitly, it is important to guarantee that the ask-everybody and all-answers primitives are fault tolerant in some way. In order to address this issue we provide a failure-detector component which is also encapsulated in the agent architecture (Figure 4 ). The aim of this component is to check all the agents in the system trying to discover the ones which have crashed.
Observe that this is a generic agent architecture: the failure detector and the facilitator components are standard for all the agents in a multi-agent system, while the KL component can be instantiated with different VKB. This architecture is formally specified in the actor algebra. The architecture of an agent is illustrated in Figure 5 . An agent¡ is composed of three actors (¡ , We assume a simple mapping between the logical names of agents and the physical names of actors. Given an agent name¡ , the corresponding physical name of the kb-actor is obtained removing the hat (thus it is ¡ ), its facilitator-actor is ¡ p and its detector-actor is ¡ ¦ . This mapping is known by all the facilitators. In a more general architecture the translation between logical and physical names of agents can be embedded in the facilitator process. In general, incoming messages are handled by the kb-actor, but if incoming messages needs some control operations then they are sent through the facilitator layer. The facilitator-actor deals with the outgoing messages and it also receives control information from other facilitators. The detector-actor implements the local unreliable failure detector mechanism: it checks all the agents in the system and it manages the list of suspected agents.
A formal specification of an unreliable failure detector component has been presented in Section 4.3. In the following we describe the kb-actor and the facilitator components and then we discuss their integration with the failure detector component.
KB-Actor Component
The kb-actor implements the knowledge-level agent which performs requests for knowledge and it is able to answer requests from other agents. The kb-actor is realized exploiting the guarded program of the actor algebra to implement its reactive behaviour:
All the outgoing primitives are sent to the facilitator. We provide here the encoding of the askeverybody and all-answers primitives which are relevant for the scope of this paper. The reader interested to the full specification of a kb-actor can refer to [6, 7] . An agent¡ uses the
primitive to ask all agents interested in p for an instantiation of p which is true in their VKB. Subsequently,¡ can execute the all-answers(p) primitive to know if all the replies concerning the proposition 
is a boolean expression which is true if all the previous guards are false (it is defined more formally in [10] ). We briefly discuss the encoding of all-answers. This primitive is implemented by sending a request to the local facilitator-actor and waiting for its answer. If the kb-actor receives a positive answer (i) then it continues the execution of the rest of the program which follows the all-answers call; otherwise (ii) it stops the program 
Facilitator Component
The distributed facilitator is formally specified as a dynamic set of local facilitator actors competence is a data structure which stores the competence of the agents in the system; answers contains information on the active conversations involving multicasting;
In Figure 6 we present a specification of a facilitator service which support the ask-everybody and all-answers primitives. We assume that a facilitator is able to translate agent names into physical actor names. The specification of a complete facilitator program for a knowledge-level Agent Communication Language can be found in [7] . When a facilitator receives an init message from a kb-actor (i), it updates its state by means of a become primitive. When a facilitator receives an ask-everybody(s, p) message, it consults its database and forwards an ask-one message to all the interested agents (ii). Then the facilitator intercepts all the answers (updandfrw message), registering them in its local state and forwarding them to the associated kb-actor (iii). This is needed to implement the all-answers primitive. Indeed, when a facilitator receives the message all-answers(self, p) it checks if all the replies concerning proposition X have been received and then communicates this control to the local kb-actor (iv). The register(self, p) and unregister(self, p) messages are forwarded to all the other facilitators in the system (v). When a facilitator receives these messages from another facilitator it updates the
data structure (vb). The protocol in (vi) supports the dynamic creation of new agents. We'll explain in detail it in Section 6.2. Table 3 summarizes the functions which operate on the fields of the state of the facilitator.
In order to forward a message the facilitator uses the forward primitive which implements a multicast interaction mechanism. We introduce it because the algebra of actors does not provide an explicit primitive for forwarding a message to a set of known actors. In the following we show that this explicit forward primitive can be simply implemented in our language. In order to prove this, we extend the algebra with a new primitive forward (x,nl,m) 
Adds to the competence data structure the information that agent¡ is able to deal with proposition
Removes agent¡ from the competence list of X . message (see Figure 7 ). When this actor finishes to send all the messages it terminates (correctly) its execution (i.e. becomes the empty term n ). (2) The behaviour of this new actor is to execute the forward of a message. When it finishes to send all the messages it terminates correctly its execution. Note that in the meantime the actor doesn't suspend its execution but it continues the program .
Integrating the Components of the Architecture
The components of the agent architecture previously discussed have been specified individually and their integration is not always trivial. The integration of the kb-actor and the facilitator-actor is simple and requires just an agreement on their respective names. In Section 5.2 we have already bound the kb-actor to the facilitator because in the encoding of the primitives the kb-actor ¡ sends the messages to the local facilitator ¡ . Therefore, in order to integrate these two components we only need to bind the facilitator with the kb-actor. This can be done substituting the expression kb-local in the facilitator program with the name of the local kb-actor is substituted with ¡ , i.e. with the local kb-actor name. The integration of the facilitator component with the unreliable failure detector is more complex and requires a careful analysis and more complex connectors. A critical point of the facilitator program which is related to failures is the implementation of the all-answers primitive (see the facilitator program in Figure 6 line (iv) ). When a facilitator receives an allanswers message from the kb-actor and an answer from an agent interested in X is still not arrived, it is possible that the agent has crashed. This means that the all-answers predicate will never succeed (because testalltag(p) will be always false and thus the facilitator will always reply allanswerno to the kb-actor). Thus whenever such a situation arises it is reasonable to contact the failure detector component to verify whether that agent is suspected to have crashed or not.
A possible solution to this problem can be obtained contacting the failure detector component and asking it for the list of suspected actors. Unfortunately this solution requires a synchronization which may slow down the performance of the facilitator component. In fact, it should wait for the list of suspected agents before answering to other queries.
The solution that we have adopted exports part of the state of the failure detector component to the facilitator: the list failures which contains the suspected agents. The new failure detector just notifies its checks to the facilitator. The state of the new local detector consists only of a list
, which is the list of all the detector actors in the system, while the list In a similar way to the integration between the kb-actor and the facilitator, we also need to . The detector executes this program until it receives a halt message from the local facilitator. If this event occurs then the detector stops forever its execution (v) .
Note that the state of the detector is dynamically updated when a new agent is created and when an existing agent terminates its computation. Indeed, when a detector receives a message updates the tags related to the query agents. Thus, if an answer is still not arrived, but the agent which has to reply is suspected by the failure detector, then that answer is ignored and the
primitive succeeds. The protocol in (vi) supports the dynamic creation of new agents and will be explained in detail in Section 6.2. The behaviour of the facilitator is extended with the protocol in (vii) to deal with messages from the failure detector component and update the list of suspected actors. In Table 4 
Analysis of Requirements
The aim of this Section is to show that our agent architecture satisfies the specification requirements for the anonymous interaction protocol discussed in Section 5. To address this issue we proceed as follows. First, we focus on the knowledge-level programming requirement showing that the anonymous interaction protocol always succeeds. This means that deadlocks are not possible, also in presence of agent failures. We'll see that this result is possible thanks to the failure detector component. Then we focus on the open-ended requirement showing that the anonymous interaction protocol supports dynamic agent creation.
Analysis of the Anonymous Interaction Protocol
Let us consider a multi-agent system composed of four agents to the kb-actor and thus the predicate all-answers(p) succeeds (see (iv) in the program in Figure  9 ). If the facilitator-actor ¡ receives the allanswers(a,p) message and
is true, then the facilitator removes each agent¨R ): then the facilitator continues to wait the answers of¨V . Sooner or later the detector will discover the failure and communicate it to the facilitator (which will update its state executing (vi)). Thus the allanswers(p) succeeds as in 2.1.
Scenario 3.
Let us consider the same domain of the scenario 2 and suppose that the agent¨V sent the answer to¡ and then it (really) crashes. Suppose also that when¡ executes the all-answers predicate, the facilitator hasn't received the message from¨V (thus
). This scenario is shown in Figure 12 .
The predicate all-answers(p) also succeeds in this scenario. Indeed, if¨V § 8 because it's impossible to know if¨V has crashed or is only very slow. Thus the all-answers(p) primitive succeeds and the message sent from¨V hasn't effect on the current execution of the primitive all-answers(p).
As we have showed above, the anonymous interaction protocol always succeeds. This means that if an agent executes an ask-everybody primitive, we are sure that sooner or later the agent will get an answer executing the all-answers primitive. No deadlocks or infinite waiting are possible, also in presence of crash failures of agents. Moreover, we have not to deal explicitly with physical names of actors and with crashes of agents. Thus the knowledge-level programming requirement is satisfied.
Analysis of the Dynamic Behaviour
Suppose that an agent¡ is able to execute tasks which take a long time to solve. An efficient and intelligent behaviour of that agent would be the following:¡ doesn't handle directly the queries sent from other agents, but instead it creates new agents which serve the requests in place of it. This is a reasonable situation: the role of agent¡ could be to filter the incoming requests and distribute them to the more adequate new agents. In order to create a new agent¢ , an existing agent can use the primitive
which creates a new agent with a new fresh name¢ and a new VKB © . We require a fresh name because we want to ensure that, at the time of creation, the name of the new agent is known only by the agent that creates it. The following is the translation of an agent primitive
into the actor algebra (we suppose that the primitive is executed by an agent¡ , as shown in Figure 13 ):
The creation of a new agent is translated into the algebra with the creation of all the actors which compose the architecture of an agent. Note that the integration of these components is realized by means of dynamic substitutions of names in the actor programs. After the creation of these actors, the kb-actor delegates their initializations to its local facilitator requires that, at the time of creation, the name of the new agent is known only by the agent that creates it. We call this property hiding name creation. The following theorem states that our encoding satisfies this property.
Theorem 1.
The encoding of the agent primitive create into the actor algebra satisfies the hiding name creation property.
Proof: the hiding name creation property follows directly from the semantics of the actor primitive create (Table 2) . Indeed, this primitive allows to hide the name of a newly created actor by means of the restriction operator m . This operator ensures that the name of a newly created actor is not reachable from the external world, but only from the creating actor. In our encoding we create a new agent by means of three actor primitives create which build the components of an agent architecture. Therefore the only actors which are able to communicate with these new ones are those of the agent creator. Then we are sure that the new agent is only accessible (known) by its creator. The only way for an agent, say¢ , to unhide its name is to send a message to an agent which is outside the scope of¢ . For example, if an agent¢ is created from an agent¡ and¢ sends a message to an agent£ , then the restriction disappears and¢ becomes reachable from the outside. Now it's simple to show that the anonymous interaction protocol supports dynamic agent creation. Since a newly created agent is unreachable from the external world, it cannot receive messages sent from other agents. The only way for an agent to receive a message sent by means of an ask-everybody primitive is register its interests. This can be done, for example, by means of a register primitive . 
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Related Work
In the subfield of agent research that focuses on agent architectures, various types of agents have been proposed that facilitate the communication process in a multi-agent system. These agents, referred to with terms like routers, mediators, brokers and so on [18] , act as intermediaries between communicating agents by providing some services. Such facilitating activities are indispensable in the context of open multi-agent systems and in particular in the context of knowledge-level communication. As mentioned before, in our approach we encapsulate a distributed facilitator mechanism in the agent architecture providing both facilitating services and knowledge-level communication.
With respect to the integration of new agents into an existing multi-agent system, we distinguish two different situations. First, there is the integration of an agent that already exists outside the system, in which case we refer to the integration as an agent introduction. An example of agent introduction can be found in [7] . Secondly, in the situation a newly integrated agent constitutes a previously nonexistent entity, we refer to the integration as an agent creation. In Section 6.2 we discuss in detail an agent primitive that can be used to create a new agent from an existing one. A particular agent creation is the act of agent cloning, which is typically performed in situations in which an agent with limited resources, faces an overload of tasks that need to be accomplished. To obviate this overload, the agent might then produce a clone of itself and subsequently delegate several of its tasks to this newly created agent. An example of agent cloning can be found in [7] .
Conclusions
In this paper we have presented an algebra of actors extended with mechanisms to model crash failures and their detection. We have shown that this algebra can be used to specify a fault tolerant software architecture and to discuss its requirements. We have presented simple connectors which allows us to integrate actor specifications of architectural components linking their names. We have shown that these assembled components satisfy our design requirements assuming the correctness of the components when considered in isolation. Our future work will concern the study of more expressive connectors among components. For example we would like to express more formally a "state export" operation by means of an adequate connector. This technique ¡ . A detailed example of a register primitive can be found in [7] .
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